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A dilemma that immigrant groups in this country have always faced is
whether to retain the customs and practices of the "motherland" or
assimilate into the dominant culture of their new home. Historically, an
immigrant group's worth in this country has been viewed in direct
connection with its "assimilability" -the extent to which the group
blended in with the dominant Anglo-European cultural landscape, adopted
"American" customs and styles of dress, and spoke the English language.1
Today, the modem inheritors of this school of thought argue that immigrant
groups must be willing to sacrifice their cultural traditions to ensure a
robust American society in which certain core values are shared by all of its
members.2
Recently, however, recognition of the historical abuses of the
assimilability index has contributed to the rise of the multiculturalism
movement, whose proponents argue that the old "melting pot" social
metaphor, which privileges the erosion of cultural distinctness in the
dominant cultural stew, is obsolete and at times discriminatory. They point
to the ways in which the notion of assimilation as a measure of immigrant
worth has been employed to vilify various unpopular immigrant groups,
leading to anti-immigrant legislation,' racial scapegoating,4  and
1. For instance, late 19th-century anti-Chinese sentiment, culminating in the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), was fueled by the popular belief that Chinese
immigrants could never contribute productively to society because their habits, customs, and
languages were too different from the dominant Anglo-European culture. See SucHENG CHAN,
ASIAN AMERIcANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 3-17 (1991); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS
FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 472-73 (1989). According to
cultural critics and legal commentators, that most assimilation theories are based on European
immigrant experiences prevents ultimate acceptance by the dominant group of many non-
European ethnic minority groups. Thus, Asian Americans, as well as Latinos and Arabs, are to
this day categorized as unassimilable foreigners. See, e.g., ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS,
AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 64-66, 108 (1998).
2. See generally PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995).
3. San Francisco's anti-Chinese "queue ordinance" was an early example of legislation that
criminalized outward manifestations of immigrant cultural difference. This 19th-century law
forbade male individuals from wearing their hair in braids. Though facially neutral, the law
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discriminatory immigration policy.' Multiculturalists insist that cultural
pluralism has made this nation strong and that immigrant groups must not
be compelled to sacrifice their unique heritages. Thus, dominant American
culture should learn from and help to celebrate the unique customs, history,
and languages of its immigrant groups.
The battles between assimilationists and multiculturalists over whether
and to what extent society should recognize and respect cultural differences
recently have taken center stage in the American criminal law. With
increasing frequency, collisions between American and foreign cultural
norms have manifested themselves in the criminal behavior of
"unassimilated" immigrants in this country. Attorneys representing these
defendants have raised as a defense their clients' culture itself. Take, for
example, the case of People v. Kimura.6 After the defendant, a Japanese-
American woman, learned of her husband's infidelity, she walked into the
Pacific Ocean near Santa Monica, California, clutching her two children in
her arms. The children drowned, but rescuers saved the defendant, who was
subsequently tried for murder. At trial, the defendant claimed that in Japan,
ritual parent-child suicide was an acceptable way of dealing with the shame
brought on the family by an unfaithful spouse. The judge trying the case
received a flood of letters from members of the Japanese-American
community urging leniency for the defendant and explaining that oyako-
specifically targeted the Chinese community, whose male members wore their hair in long
"queues" or braids to symbolize subservience to the Manchu emperor. See Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,
12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546) (finding that the San Francisco queue ordinance
was a cruel and unusual punishment and, insofar as it was directed specifically against Chinese
men, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
4. See Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 111, 112 (1996) (critiquing the view of immigrants as a drain on national
resources embodied in BRIMELOW, supra note 2, as antiempirical and unfounded).
5. In upholding the 1888 Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 , which expanded the Chinese
Exclusion Act by barring even those Chinese laborers who left the United States with return
certificates, the Supreme Court employed reasoning that was explicitly assimilationist: "If,
therefore, the government of the United States ... considers the presence of foreigners of a
different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
security, their exclusion is not to be stayed .... ," The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889); see also, e.g., ANCHETA, supra note 1, at 85 (observing that the nativist sentiment that
informs an 1876 California legislature report stating that the Chinese "have never adapted
themselves to our habits, mode of dress, or our educational system" finds resonance in modem
immigration law and anti-immigrant rhetoric); James J. Orlow, America's Incoherent Immigration
Policy: Some Problems and Solutions, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 931, 937 n.4 (1982) (providing a
catalog of some of the most egregious examples of how immigration law has been employed to
exclude Asians and other "undesirables").
6. No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985) (unpublished decision). For
descriptions of the Kimura case, see Daina Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion,
Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1053, 1117-18 (1994); Tamara Jones, An
"Honorable" Murder/Mother Meant To Die, Too, in a Ritual Parent-Child Suicide, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 14, 1985, at 19; Leslie Pound, Mother's Tragic Crime Exposes a Culture Gap, CHI. TRIB.,
June 10, 1985, at 1; and Robert W. Stewart, Probation Given to Mother in Drowning of Her Two
Children, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22 1985, § II, at 1.
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shinj9, parent-child suicide, would not be considered murder in Japan.
Kimura's homicide charge was reduced to voluntary manslaughter, and she
was sentenced to one year in jail (which she had already served), five years
of probation, and psychiatric counseling.'
Those who support the use of cultural defenses like the one raised in the
Kimura case argue that the face of American society is changing rapidly
and that the American criminal legal system must change as well if it is to
effectively mete out justice to all who come before it. These advocates
claim that recognition of a cultural defense will advance two desirable ends
consistent with the broader goals of liberal society and the criminal law: (1)
the achievement of individualized justice for the defendant; and (2) a
commitment to cultural pluralism.9 Critics of the cultural defense respond
by charging that society's interests in maintaining order and forging bonds
among people by imposing a common set of cultural values militate against
recognition of the cultural defense." Moreover, in the most noteworthy
recent attack on the cultural defense, Doriane Lambelet Coleman has
marshaled equal protection law to argue against recognition of the cultural
defense.
Coleman first argues that multiculturalism should take a back seat to
the interests of victims and potential victims of criminal acts perpetrated by
"cultural defendants."" These interests include the right to "obtain[]
protection and relief through a nondiscriminatory application of the
criminal law." 2 On this account, the cultural defense, while ostensibly
advancing individualized justice for the defendant from a foreign culture,
trammels the rights of immigrant women and children who are often the
victims of "cultural" crimes. 3 Coleman goes on to argue concomitantly
that allowing cultural evidence to be dispositive also results in the
construction of an entire defense doctrine that is unavailable to similarly
7. See Jones, supra note 6, at 19.
8. See Stewart, supra note 6, § II, at 1
9. See Note, he Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293, 1296
(1986); Michael Fischer, Note, The Human Rights Implications of a "Cultural Defense," 6 S.
CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 663, 679-85 (1998).
10. See John C. Lyman, Note, Cultural Defense: Viable Doctrine or Wishful Thinking?, 9
CRIm. JusT. J. 87, 105-11 (1986); Julia P. Sams, Note, The Availability of the "Cultural Defense"
as an Excuse for Criminal Behavior, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335,339-40 (1986).
11. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The
Liberals' Dilemma, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1097 (1996).
12. Id.
13. Coleman supports her theory by reasoning that one of the criminal law's functions, long
championed by liberals and civil libertarians, is to guarantee the life and liberty interests of
members of society, "particularly those, including women, children, and minorities, who have not
traditionally had significant access to the political process." 1l at 1127. A balancing test that
Coleman constructs yields the conclusion that the interests of immigrant victims should be
privileged over the interests of immigrant defendants.
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situated defendants who are not immigrants. 4 Coleman compares Kimura
to the highly publicized Susan Smith case 5 in which the defendant, like
Kimura, drowned her two young children, but unlike Kimura, received the
"penultimate" punishment of life imprisonment. 6 Coleman contends that
the selective availability of the cultural defense to those with "culture" also
contradicts the Fourteenth Amendment's promise to protect the rights of all
defendants equally in the criminal process. 7
Despite this significant backlash against the cultural defense in the
literature, many courts have nevertheless permitted the introduction of
cultural evidence in criminal trials. In recent years, defendants have
successfully raised cultural defenses in cases with fact patterns as disparate
as rape,' 8 child molestation, politically motivated suicide,' and violence
connected with spousal infidelity.2 ' Ostensibly, such cases, to the extent
that they reflect judicial receptiveness to the notion that foreign culture may
mitigate a foreign defendant's culpability, represent victories for the twin
rationales of cultural pluralism and individualized justice.
This Note contends, however, that the doctrinal framework courts
currently employ to try cultural defense cases, insofar as it is reliant on the
temporary-insanity model, results ironically in both the sacrifice of
pluralistic values and the erasure of culture itself from the judicial analysis.
This Note accordingly attempts to reconstruct the cultural defense doctrine
so as to achieve the greatest consistency with the original justificatory
narrative of cultural pluralism, proposing a "synthetic" model of the
cultural defense and the existing criminal law doctrine of adequate
14. This Note will for the most part address Coleman's second claim: that a formalized
cultural defense discriminates against members of the dominant culture. A powerful rejoinder to
Coleman's victim-centered equal protection argument based on an "intersectionality analysis"
has already been provided by Leti Volpp. Volpp observes that
the criminal justice system is predicated on patriarchal structures, and I] attempts to
strengthen criminal enforcement will not change our culture of violence. To advocate for
"victims-rights" by increasing criminal penalties, without simultaneously critiquing a
system that "spawns racism, police brutality, corruption, and a value system of property
before people," will not be an ultimately liberatory project.
Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1573, 1588 (1996) (quoting Man J. Matsuda, Crime and Punishment, MS., Nov.-
Dec. 1994, at 88-89); see also infra note 142.
15. See Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury Rejects Execution for Woman Who Drowned Sons, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 29, 1995, at Al.
16. Coleman, supra note 11, at 1143 (" Susan Smith was not so fortunate [as Kimural.").
17. See id. at 1144.
18. See Deirdre Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion
of Culture: A Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 1 (1994) (discussing People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1985)
(unpublished decision)).
19. See Farah Sultana Brelvi, "News of the Weird": Specious Normativity and the Problem of
the Cultural Defense, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 657, 658 (1997).
20. See Richard Lacayo, Whose Peers?, TIME, Sept. 22, 1993, at 60.
21. See, e.g., People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1991).
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provocation. Central to the argument for an integrative vision of culture and
provocation is an engagement of the critics of the cultural defense on the
very legal terrain they have coopted as the substrate of their arguments:
antidiscrimination law. Making antidiscrimination doctrine a site of critical
contestation provides a (long overdue) rejoinder to those commentators
who uncritically contend that equal protection law precludes judicial
recognition of a cultural defense. By tracing the common-law roots of
provocation and observing how this doctrine maps on to the logic of the
cultural defense, this Note seeks to recast antidiscrimination principles in
favor of a new understanding of cultural evidence in the criminal law.
Part I introduces the general rationale behind the cultural defense and
outlines the various permutations of the defense. Part II analyzes the
doctrinal framework jurists have traditionally used to adjudicate cultural
defense claims, revealing this framework's tacit reliance on temporary
insanity as a doctrinal analogue. Part II then argues that the separate logics
underlying the cultural defense and temporary-insanity doctrine are
fundamentally incompatible, and concludes therefore that using the latter as
a doctrinal lens through which to consider cultural evidence is improper.
Part III begins by observing that proponents of the cultural defense
ironically provide ammunition for its critics by adhering to the vision of
strict "incorporation" of a formalized cultural defense into the criminal
law. This Part argues that the notion of a cultural defense as a distinct
doctrinal addition to the criminal law-as well as the equal protection
attack that depends on it-are flawed. Hence, the common ground where
both advocates and critics of the cultural defense agree the controversy
coalesces is also where they are both wrong. Ultimately, Part m concludes,
both camps of commentators have failed to consider how the cultural
defense is already "built into" the existing criminal law. Indeed, as Part IV
demonstrates, if adequate provocation doctrine is itself a dominant cultural
defense, exclusion of foreign cultural evidence from this doctrine will result
in the effective denial of the defense to cultural defendants, thus
jeopardizing principles of procedural fairness and equality before the law.
I. THE CuLTuRAL DEFENSE EXPLAINED
The logic behind the cultural defense dictates that a defendant, often a
recent immigrant or refugee, should be allowed to introduce evidence of her
foreign cultural values in order to mitigate or negate her culpability. In
other words, a defendant should not be punished as severely (and in some
cases should not be punished at all) for behavior that is sanctioned or even
promoted by the culture of her homeland. The rationale behind the cultural
defense thus rests essentially on the fundamental criminal law principle that
a defendant should not be held responsible for acts she committed without
18491999]
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the requisite actus reus or mens rea.
This is not to say, of course, that other underlying rationales for
criminal punishment are not implicated by the cultural defense. While the
desert-based model of punishment may counsel in favor of reducing the
"cultural" defendant's charge, commentators have argued that courts'
receptiveness to any form of cultural defense sends the message to
foreigners that their criminal behavior is acceptable. Under this theory, the
cultural defense thwarts the deterrent effect of the criminal law, promoting
crime among immigrant groups."2 Commentators have raised several
considerations that problematize the "anti-deterrent" thesis. Daina Chin,
for instance, contends that recognition of a cultural defense may in fact
result in increased crime deterrence in immigrant communities. According
to Chiu, permitting a cultural defense would communicate that an
immigrant group's customs will be accorded some respect, thereby
reducing friction in the immigrant community and resulting in faster
adaptation to this country.'
But perhaps the strongest argument against the anti-deterrent critique
concedes that a cultural defense may in some instances result in an increase
of illegal behavior, but observes that the criminal law must routinely
balance its interests in maintaining social order through general deterrence
and achieving individualized retributive justice. Criminal law defenses
based on duress and provocation, for example, manifest a willingness to
sacrifice a certain degree of effectiveness in preventing undesirable
behavior in order to take cognizance of circumstances in which defendants
are not personally culpable. After all, an absolute bar on provocation and
duress claims would no doubt decrease the frequency of violence and
murder in society, but only at the cost of punishing those whom we regard
as not individually culpable. My proposal for a synthetic model of the
provocation and cultural defenses argues that essentially the same balancing
theory that has resulted in the criminal law's incorporation of defenses such
as duress and provocation counsels in favor of a limited recognition of
cultural evidence in cases involving "nonvolitional" crimes. If, as this Note
contends, the existence of the provocation defense necessitates acceptance
of cultural evidence at trial, then the deterrence rationale does not prevent
22. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 1337; Valerie L. Sacks, An Indefensible Defense: On the
Misuse of Culture in Criminal Law, 13 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 523, 541-42 (1996). Those who
focus on "anti-deterrent" consequences to argue against the cultural defense frequently cite the
statement of one battered Chinese woman whose husband reportedly informed her that "if this is
the kind of sentence you get for killing your wife, I could do anything to you. I have the money
for a good attorney." Coleman, supra note 11, at 1338.
23. See Chiu, supra note 6, at 1116-18. Michael Fischer adds that "the cultural defense
would draw attention to the cultural aspects of a particular immigrant group which are at odds
with the laws of the United States. As a result, the word would spread throughout the immigrant
community that such conduct is not acceptable." Fischer, supra note 9, at 682.
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cultural claims (since it clearly does not preclude provocation claims). The
remainder of this analysis will therefore address the debate surrounding the
retributive rationale in favor of a cultural defense.
Within the framework of the retributive rationale are many different
permutations of the cultural defense dealing with various definitions and
aspects of the defendant's mental state.24 I will distinguish between cultural
defenses that are raised in cases involving volitional (willed) behavior and
nonvolitional (automatic) behavior. Nonvolitional acts in the context of
family violence provide the basis for perhaps the most notorious and
controversial uses of the cultural defense. Certainly these claims attract the
most attention from the legal community' and make the biggest headlines
in the popular media.26 For these reasons, this Note will focus on
nonvolitional cultural defenses. Nevertheless, a brief explanation of each
context is appropriate.
In volitional behavior cases, the defendant may admit that she willfully
or purposely committed the offensive act, but may raise the cultural defense
to demonstrate that she lacked specific culpable intent. In other words, she
will assert that she was unaware that her behavior was proscribed by society
and the law. For example, in a recent highly publicized case, a Muslim,
Albanian-American defendant named Sadri Krasniqi was arrested after
witnesses reported that he had fondled his four-year-old daughter under her
dress. But prosecutors dropped charges against the defendant after they
were persuaded that because parent-child sex is unimaginable in Albania,
all forms of parental fondling constitute socially acceptable behavior.27
According to the rationale of the defense's "cultural argument," the
defendant behaved consistently with the cultural norms of his homeland and
did not realize that the offensive behavior was illegal or even discouraged;
he therefore lacked the necessary criminal mental state.
In nonvolitional cultural claims, the defendant may be generally
cognizant of the illegality or offensiveness of her behavior, but is simply
unable to control her actions. Nonvolitional cultural defenses contest that
the actus reus (or voluntary act) component of the crime has been proven.
Take, for example, the Japanese-American defendant who attempted to
commit parent-child suicide in People v. Kimura. The defense in the
24. Here I mean "mental state" in its broader sense. For the purposes of this analysis, a
defendant's mental state encompasses intent and purpose requirements associated with a
defendant's mens rea, as well as questions addressing whether and to what degree the criminal
behavior was a voluntary act--considerations that generally fall under the rubric of "actus reus."
See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRmINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERiALS 121-23 (3d ed. 1996).
25. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 11, at 1093; Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male
Violence: Are Feminist and Multicultural Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?,
70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1995); Volpp, supra note 14, at 1573.
26. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Should Culture Be a Defense, NEWSDAY, Apr. 20, 1989, at
80; sources cited supra note 6; sources cited infra note 118.
27. See Brelvi, supra note 19, at 658.
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Kimura case asserted that knowledge of a husband's infidelity would heap
such tremendous indignity on a Japanese wife that she would be driven to a
deranged state in which she would be incapable of understanding or
exercising meaningful control over her behavior. Although the defendant
may have been fully aware of American murder laws, she was predisposed
by her cultural roots to lose the capacity to act according to these laws.
According to the defense's theory, the defendant's cultural "programming"
dictated that she attempt to save face by committing oyako-shinj9, parent-
child suicide.2"
II. TEMPORARY INSANrrY, DUAL IDENTrrY, AND THE CULTURAL DEFENSE
The defense attorney in People v. Kimura sought to combine a claim
that the defendant's action was nonvolitional with the strategic introduction
of cultural evidence into the trial by adopting temporary insanity as a
doctrinal analogue. 9 Through the logic of this defense, culture came to
signify insanity: Confirmation of the influence of the defendant's culture on
her criminal behavior was treated by the court (at the behest of the defense)
as evidence of the defendant's irrationality. At trial, the defense claimed
that the defendant was "mentally deranged at the time [of the commission
of the crime]-with a Japanese flavor, a Japanese fashion."30 Psychiatrists
brought in by the defense attested to the defendant's mental incapacity at
the time of her crime, stating that Kimura was "suffering from psychotic
depression and delusions" when she attempted oyako-shinja.31 The
defendant's behavior was judged "impulsive" and "unpremeditated." 32
The prosecutor was convinced by such testimony that Kimura "showed she
was not a rational person at the time" 3 3 and therefore lacked the requisite
malice aforethought for a murder conviction. According to the logic
employed by the defense, Kimura's culture imparted to her a predisposition
toward insanity.
Both critics and advocates of the cultural defense have noted that the
use of the insanity doctrine to try cultural defense claims leads to the
undesirable legal association of culturally informed actions and criminally
insane behavior.' A 1985 Harvard Law Review Note argued that a
28. See Chiu, supra note 6, at 1117-18.
29. See Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A
Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REv. 101, 119, 121 (1997); Alison Dundes Renteln, A
Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
437,463 (1993).
30. Pound, supra note 6.
31. Chiu, supra note 6, at 1117.
32. L
33. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1.
34. See, e.g., Andrew M. Kanter, The Yenaldlooshi in Court and the Killing of a Witch: The
Case for an Indian Cultural Defense, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 411, 439 (1995); Leti Volpp,
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judgment of insanity for a cultural defendant "is an affront to the dignity of
the accused because it condemns conduct deemed acceptable by her culture.
Indeed, being labeled a lunatic may be more degrading than being branded
a criminal." 3 Although these are compelling arguments, this Note advances
the claim that such ex post policy considerations are superfluous since
application of temporary-insanity doctrine logically precludes introduction
of cultural evidence. In other words, consideration of the pernicious
association of the criminal and the cultural is superseded by the ex ante
concern of the fundamental incompatibility of the same.
In this light, both the strategic importance and the deep problematics of
employing mental defect as a lens through which to understand cultural
evidence are manifest in the Kimura court's strained jurisprudence of "split
identity." Significantly, both the defense attorneys and the court were
careful to restrict their characterization of Kimura as mentally incapacitated
at the time of her attempt to commit oyako-shinja. Nearly every description
of the defendant as irrational or mentally deranged offered by the defense
attorneys, the experts, and the judge was qualified with the clarification: "at
the time."36 These statements reflect the conspicuous effort on the part of
all parties involved to distinguish between the defendant's mental state
when she committed the act and her mental state as she stood trial for her
crime. This attempt to divide the defendant into two identities-rational and
irrational-tracks the logic of the temporary-insanity defense.
A. Difference That Isn't: A Cultural Homogeneity of Defect
Perversely, the split-identity model borrowed from temporary-insanity
doctrine is instrumental in both enabling the success of "cultural defense"
claims and eliminating culture as a meaningful factor in the court's
analysis. On the one hand, it is precisely by dividing the defendant into
rational and irrational identities that a court may sympathize with the
defendant and grant her leniency Understanding the person who engaged
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
57, 95 (1994); Sharon M. Tomao, Note, The Cultural Defense: Traditional or Fornal?, 10 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 241, 253 (1996); Note, supra note 9, at 1296.
35. Note, supra note 9, at 1296.
36. See Jones, supra note 6, at 19.
37. Victoria Nourse discusses the way in which a court's ability to see itself in the
defendant's position is instrumental in a sympathetic judgment:
It helps.., to see why we might distinguish intuitively the rapist killer from the [man
who kills his departing spouse]. In the first case, we feel "with" the killer because she is
expressing outrage in ways that communicate an emotional judgment (about the
wrongfulness of rape) that is uncontroversially shared, indeed, that the law itself
recognizes. Such claims resonate because we cannot distinguish the defendant's sense of
emotional wrongfulness from the law's own sense of appropriate retribution. The
defendant's emotional judgments are the law's own. In this sense, the defendant is us.
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in criminal behavior and the person who stands trial as separate and distinct
enables a court to focus exclusively on the latter identity, which is familiar
and unthreatening, for the purposes of trying the defendant." The court may
in this way justify granting clemency to the defendant on the grounds that
she "didn't really do it." In fact, the court reasons that the defendant's
latter identity was victimized by her former self-by the insane identity-
and is therefore "in need of sympathy [and] support."39 In this respect, the
split-identity paradigm was precisely what made the cultural defense in
People v. Kimura "work."
It is worth examining, nevertheless, the limited role that culture did
play in the court's analysis. Ostensibly, evidence of the defendant's
Japanese cultural background demonstrated a specific brand of mental
defect that is unidentifiable from the Anglo-American cultural vantage:
According to the defense, Kimura suffered from a "Japanese-flavor"
mental incapacity. The defendant's cultural background did not itself
provide an excuse, and was relevant only insofar as it shed light on her
temporarily insane mental state.'n Yet this theory is at odds with the basic
notion underlying all cultural defense claims that the defendant's foreign
culture functions as a legitimate yet alternative source of norms-norms
that unfortunately impelled the defendant to behave in a way cognizable by
American society only as criminal. These cultural norms are what bind a
people together and compel them to act in a similar fashion. To assert that
Kimura suffered from a Japanese-style mental defect is to suggest that the
defendant acted in an aberrant manner even judging by Japanese norms.
Such a characterization relegates the function of culture in the defense's
argument to defining and distinguishing different kinds of mental defect.
The problem, however, is that the logic of the cultural defense focuses
not on the linkages between culture and "irrational" mental defect, but
rather on the very rational process by which culture influences people's
Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331, 1392 (1997).
38. Daina Chiu advances a powerful theory of "difference-as-sameness" to describe the
court's approach to the Kimura case. According to Chiu, "recognition of the defendant's culture
[occurs] only when there is explicit or implicit congruence between her cultural values and the
mainstream's cultural values." Chiu, supra note 6, at 1116. Under this conception, judicial
sympathy for Kimura stemmed from "identification with the parental anguish of surviving the
death of one's child." Id. The court recognized-and took pity on-the defendant as bereft
mother-a figure that was culturally familiar. This Note takes Chiu's "difference-as-sameness"
model as a point of departure, arguing that that it is the court's reliance on temporary-insanity
doctrine that results in the elision of culture from its analysis. For an important perspective on the
paradoxical intersection between the concepts of difference and sameness in the law's treatment
of homosexuals, see EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 19-20 (1990),
which analyzes the "homosexual panic" defense used by gay-bashers through the lens of
simultaneously operative "minoritizing" and "universalizing" discourses.
39. Chin, supra note 6, at 1117.
40. See Anh T. Liam, Culture as a Defense: Preventing Judicial Bias Against Asians and
Pacific Islanders, 1 ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 49, 61 (1993).
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behavior. The introduction of cultural evidence attempts to answer the
question of why the defendant acted as she did, but the insanity defense
attempts to circumvent entirely the question of "why"; it depends for its
theoretical coherence on the very denial of reasonable explanation. The
defense's folly in Kimura was that it presented the defendant's cultural
claim in a way that attempted to do the impossible: provide a (cultural)
explanation for insanity.
Mental defect of any stripe implies a sense of abnormality that did not
obtain in the defense attorney's analytic scheme. After all, defect implies
difference. If an individual is mentally defective, she is by definition
normatively distinct from the reasonable or normal person. In the defense's
cultural argument, this crucial element of abnormality was supplanted by
universality, by the assumption that all Japanese people share Kimura's
peculiar "Japanese-flavor" mental defect. The concept of intracultural
difference, presumably bound up with the notion of defect, was replaced by
a culturally standardized homogeneity of aberrance-a mouthful of a label
that is, of course, oxymoronic. To claim that nearly everyone from a given
culture is abnormal (or even possesses the same latent capacity for
abnormality) is nonsensical because it is simply to assert a definition of
what is "normal."'" Such rhetorical maneuvering illustrates that the real
illogic lies perhaps not with Kimura's criminal behavior, but rather in the
defense's characterization of the defendant as "cultural/defective."
B. Split Identity and Sympathy Resonance: The Cultural Defendant as
Rational/Familiar
The cultural defense implicates culture functioning as sameness-as the
common body of values and history that a people share and that therefore
makes individuals similar42 This concept is fundamentally inconsistent
with the notion of defect (mental or otherwise) insofar as the latter
41. One could argue that members of the dominant culture might still believe that all
members of a minority group are indeed aberrant, but underscoring the illogic of such a move is in
many respects precisely my point. The reasoning through which courts associate the cultural and
the defective is at odds with the presumed goal of admitting cultural evidence at trial-to allow
the accused to demonstrate that her behavior was understandable given her cultural background.
For a court to regard the commission of oyako-shinja as at once an insane act and a culturally
influenced reaction is untenable since the former determination presumably makes the latter
irrelevant at a criminal trial. After all, the court could apply the dominant cultural and legal
standards of insanity and achieve the same result. A cultural explanation for behavior is
intelligible only if the court is willing to consider that the defendant was not insane.
42. This is not to say that individual members of a minority culture may exhibit aberrant
behavior and become temporarily insane. However, if they become "insane" and act in a way that
others from the same cultural background would not act when similarly situated, then under the
theory set forth here, they would be ineligible to raise the cultural defense. The introduction of
cultural evidence relies on the notion of intracultural sameness; when this principle is violated, the
defense should fail.
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necessarily involves aberrance. The incompatibility between culture as
sameness and defect as difference makes the defense attorney's argument
(predicated as it was on the notion of culture signifying defect) plainly
unreasonable. Moreover, such tension between culture and defect registers
not only at the level of internal difference between people of the same
culture but also (and more importantly for this analysis) at the level of
ostensible cross-cultural difference. Indeed, as Daina Chin observes, the
Kimura court's determination that the defendant's behavior reflected a
temporarily insane state effectively collapsed any significant difference
between foreign and native cultural systems.'
To see how this is so, consider how the Kimura court, in dividing the
defendant into irrational and rational identities, implicitly associated the
latter with familiar "native" cultural norms. In the court's analysis, the
rational/irrational split mapped insidiously onto a native/foreign binary
opposition. Stated differently, the distinction between rational and irrational
mental states implicated by the temporary-insanity paradigm provided the
court with a convenient framework to excuse the defendant by ignoring her
culture. Coding rational/irrational into native/cultural enabled the court to
construct the defendant so as to make her familiar to dominant cultural
sensibilities. By focusing exclusively on the defendant's native identity, the
court was able to think of her as a victim of her own culture and generate
sympathy for her.' While ostensibly considering how culture was relevant
to Kimura's "psychotic" action, the court's adoption of temporary-insanity
doctrine in fact eliminated culture as an exculpatory factor from the
analysis.45
The court, then, dispensed with the defendant's culture in the same
move that it granted her leniency. The court's acceptance of Kimura's
cultural argument depended ironically on the extent to which she was made
cognizable under dominant cultural norms: Cultural symmetry, not a
respect for difference, determined the success of the defense's argument.
Such insistence on symmetry obviated the significance of Kimura's culture
as an alternative source of norms, subverting the reason to consider the
influence of cultural background in the first place; after all, a court could
apply ordinary temporary-insanity doctrine to achieve the same result.46
43. See Chiu, supra note 6, at 1117.
44. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
45. Daina Chiu argues in the same vein that many applications of the cultural defense depend
on the extent to which the culturally influenced behavior resonates with mainstream or dominant
cultural values. Chiu believes, however, that such covert fixation on cultural symmetry is not
necessarily a byproduct of the imposition of the temporary-insanity doctrine on cultural evidence
per se. Instead, "difference-as-sameness" reasoning arises from any hybrid approach courts take
that compromises between adopting a new, formalized cultural defense and treating "cultural"
defendants no differently from other criminal defendants. See Chiu, supra note 6, at 1112-20.
46. See supra note 41.
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Such suppression of difference is symptomatic of the tension between
culture as providing a behavioral explanation and insanity as definitionally
defying explanation: An attempt to combine the two elements inevitably
results in the sacrifice of one.
An honest consideration of Kimura's culture would no doubt have
defused the court's sympathy-generating mechanism because it would have
necessitated confronting true intercultural difference. Under this
interpretation, the Kimura court realized in advance that it would not be
able to identify and sympathize with an identity that was unfamiliar and
potentially threatening. It accordingly adopted a jurisprudence that was
predicated on the concealment of this identity--or the denial of its
existence-for the purposes of assigning responsibility. The efficacy of this
version of the cultural defense depended ironically on culture's
subordination to defect--on the extent to which culture as cross-cultural
difference could be erased.
Such erasure furthermore reveals how, much as the culture-as-defect
theory is logically untenable, a "true" cultural defense is incompatible with
any notion of split identity. Inserting culture into the court's analysis
implies a continuity of personhood that is inconsistent with the Kimura
court's division of the defendant into rational and irrational identities. If we
are to treat seriously the notion that the defendant's culture influenced her
behavior, her identity at the time of her criminal behavior and her identity
when she stood trial are indistinguishable. A causal analysis of both the
temporary-insanity defense and the cultural defense model is useful for
identifying how the unitary identity posited by the latter resists imposition
of the split-identity paradigm.
C. Temporary Insanity and the Reasonable Person: Toward a Causal
Theory of Culpability
1. Split Mental States
The prevailing rationale behind the insanity defense holds that
punishment would be unfair based on the offender's lack of personal
responsibility when committing the crime. The insanity defense therefore
focuses almost exclusively on the offender's state of mind at the time of the
crime. The famous M'Naghten Rule, for example, centers around the
defendant's ability to discern the difference between right and wrong and
does not allow for consideration of an inability to control one's behavior.47
47. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Although subsequent insanity tests
incorporated an "impulse control" component, see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 4.01 (1980), Congress amended the federal insanity statute to retain only the
cognition element after a jury relied on the insanity defense to acquit John Hinckley of attempting
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One might argue that traditional mens rea analysis, insofar as it
examines the defendant's capacity for criminal responsibility, is
incompatible with an understanding of the defendant as exhibiting a split
identity. However, as I argued in the context of Kimura, focusing on the
defendant's ability to appreciate right and wrong at the time of the crime
necessarily involves distinguishing between the defendant's impaired
mental state and the rational mental state to which she presumably returns
after the crime. In other words, courts must acknowledge that at one point
in time the defendant lacked the ability to distinguish right and wrong, and
at a later time, she regained this ability. Traditional mens rea analysis in this
sense involves the legal construction of the defendant as manifesting
irrational and rational selves.
My argument here is less psychologically based than jurisprudentially
descriptive. The notion of split states of mind does not depend on any
radical claim of psychological disassociation in the defendant, but instead
merely observes that courts understand temporary-insanity claims to assert
that the defendant was in some significant sense not herself when she
committed the crime.48 Under this interpretation, courts reason that the
cause of the defendant's behavior was exogenous to her rational
personality; this cause is an affliction that must be purged from the
victim/defendant in order to make her normal again.49 The legal
construction of split mental states in turn plays a central role in determining
the defendant's responsibility for her behavior. A court that accepts a
temporary-insanity claim reasons that the defendant's latter "rational" state
of mind should not be held responsible for actions committed by the
to murder President Reagan. See Insanity Defense Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 98
Stat. 1838, 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1994)); Sherry F. Colb, The Three Faces of Evil,
86 GEO. L.J. 677, 696 (1998) (reviewing ELYN R. SAKS WITH STEPHEN H. BEHNKE, JEKYLL ON
TRIAL (1997)) (discussing the Hinckley-impulse control connection). Indeed, commentators have
observed that adding an impulse-control component would betray moral desert principles of
culpability, thereby robbing the insanity defense of any philosophical coherence.
Sherry F. Colb, for instance, argues that a large proportion of the public is skeptical when
learning of defendants acquitted on an impulse-control theory of insanity. "Such defendants,"
writes Colb, "by the lights of many, may be as guilty as (or more guilty than) the garden-variety
defendants convicted of a crime." Id. at 697. According to Colb, "the psychopath who injures
others without compunction strikes many as the embodiment of evil." Id. In response to
opposition to impulse control acquittals, many states have developed a "guilty and mentally ill"
verdict category. See id. at 696. For a helpful overview of the various insanity rules, see Abraham
S. Goldstein, Excuse: Insanity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 735, 736-40 (Sanford
H. Kadish ed., 1983).
48. See infra notes 29-53, 56-59 and accompanying text.
49. Abraham Goldstein adopts this insanity-as-parasite metaphor, observing that the
defendant who raises the insanity defense "tries to shift the responsibility from himself to
something called mental disease, which kept him from being what he appeared to be, a man
committing crime with a full measure of culpability." ABRAHAM S GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 18-19 (1967).
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"irrational" identity.50
2. The Internal/External Trope and Legal Disassociation
The traditional mens rea approach is therefore perfectly consistent with
an explanation of the temporary-insanity defense based on a theory of split
identity. A claim of temporary insanity that assumes no identity
disassociation (i.e., that the mental states manifested by the defendant were
not distinct) would provide no excuse for the defendant's behavior. Since
the defendant is usually deemed rational at trial and is presumably
responsible for her actions, she would be held culpable for any act she
committed at an earlier time absent a claim that she is somehow distinct or
disassociated from her former self. Without a disassociative component, a
claim of temporary insanity would be incoherent.
Consider, in this light, the organizing trope of "internal/external" that
some commentators believe anchors the distinction between insanity
doctrine and other mitigating excuses. John Kaplan and his coauthors write:
[O]ther defenses may manifest themselves through mental states, but
they all derive in some way from objective or external forces, and are
thus limited by the "reasonable person" standard. Though normally
we attribute a bad act to a malevolent character, an external excuse
offers another explanation. Yet the insanity defense turns, in effect,
on an internal cause. Whether we call the cause bad character,
defective personality, or mental illness, it is, almost by definition, in
the very nature of the insane criminal to commit crimes.5
Again, while other defenses retain a strong "explanatory" component, the
insanity defense operates by denying external explanation. We typically
trace the insane defendant's irrational behavior back only to her mental
defect as a source. We resign ourselves to the fact that the defendant's
50. Other commentators have observed the nexus between personal identity theory and
criminal insanity doctrine. Raymond Duff, for instance, observes that insufficient continuity of
identity exists when a sane offender later becomes insane, and argues that this offender therefore
should not be punished for the crime. RAYMOND DuFF, TRIALs AND PuNISHMENT 15-22 (1986).
There is no reason to believe that the defendant manifests a continuity of identity in the inverse
scenario: if he is insane when he commits the offense but later becomes sane. Moreover, the
"disassociative" model of mental defect finds resonance in Michael Bayles's Humean, character-
based model of insanity and culpability. Bayles explains that the impulse control component of
insanity doctrine is in fact irrelevant to the question of moral blameworthiness: "[v]hether the
accused could have helped doing what he did, whether he had the capacity to conform to the law,
is itself irrelevant to an excuse... because the conduct ... may be good evidence of an
undesirable character trait .... Conversely, according to Bayles, temporary insanity allows the
accused to escape moral blame because it prevents the conduct from "indicating an undesirable
disposition the actor still has." Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal
Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL. 5, 17 (1982).
5 1. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 714.
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behavior is largely inexplicable except as a by-product of an internal
medical condition or psychological defect. The defendant's mental defect
represents a causal dead end.
In the context of temporary insanity, this dead end ensures that there
exists no nexus between the defendant's rational and irrational mental
states. If the source of the temporarily insane defendant's criminal behavior
were not physically internal, this source would "spill over" and manifest
itself in her rational consciousness. An external explanation of "irrational"
behavior would make the defendant subject to the reasonable person
standard,52 precluding application of the mental defect paradigm.
Paradoxically, then, a view of insanity as physically internal is essential to
conceptualizing insanity as external to the defendant's rational
consciousness in the context of temporary insanity." The abused wife
might claim that she killed her husband because she was provoked into a
"heat of passion," 54 but not because she was somehow not herself. Such a
defendant should not be able to raise a temporary-insanity defense because
her rational identity is presumably implicated in the criminal act; her
invocation of the reasonable person standard makes it impossible to
conceive of the defendant's consciousness as manifesting two distinct
phases. It is precisely because mens rea analysis does not look past mental
defect as a cause of the defendant's behavior-because insanity is
conceived as perfectly sef-contained 55-that the temporarily insane
defendant's "rational identity" may avoid criminal responsibility.
A good illustration of this theory is the famous example of the
defendant who has been insane in the past, but whose violent outbursts and
tendency to engage in psychotic behavior may be controlled by medication.
The New Jersey Superior Court has ruled that a schizophrenic who failed to
take his medication "allowed himself to become psychotic, with the
resulting damage done by his own hands. He is liable for the consequences
52. In other words, courts would be able to question whether a reasonable person subjected to
similar external stimuli would have behaved as the defendant behaved. Such a line of inquiry is
integral to application of the duress, provocation, and self-defense doctrines (all of which are
raised in cases involving "external" causes of behavior), see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
ScoTT, JR., CRIMiNAL LAW (2d ed. 1986) § 5.3, at 432-34, § 5.7, at 454-55, § 7.19(b), at 654-61,
but foreign to temporary-insanity claims.
53. Kaplan and his coauthors also recognize this paradoxical dialectic when they employ the
Cartesian concept of a mind-body split to explain the insanity defense. According to the authors,
many of the problems of insanity doctrine would be solved if scientific theory established insanity
as a "source of behavior that is physically internal but morally external, in other words, part of the
body but not part of the moral phenomenon called character or the self." KAPLAN Er AL., supra
note 24, at 715.
54. See discussion infra Section III.B.
55. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 714-15. Note that the temporarily insane
defendant's insanity is "internal" only to his irrational state of mind. When he passes into his
rational consciousness, the defendant's insanity becomes "external" because it disappears. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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of that conduct.... [I]t is obvious that he was the person who allowed the
condition to result .... [H]is having allowed the condition was the
reasonably foreseeable consequence of his acts .... ,, 56In essence, the court
ruled that responsibility attached to the defendant because the source of the
criminal behavior was no longer "self contained" -i.e., restricted to his
irrational identity-but instead spilled over into the realm of his rational
consciousness.
While one may divide the defendant into medicated/rational and
unmedicated/irrational states of mind, the court made clear that these states
were not distinct for the purposes of assigning legal responsibility. Because
the defendant's ability to control his "irrational self' while still in a rational
state of mind implicated an "external factor" in the analysis and required
application of the reasonable person standard,57 the defendant could not
raise the temporary-insanity defense. Once a bridge is established between
the defendant's rational and irrational mental states, the offensive behavior
may be traced back to his rational identity and the defendant no longer has a
defense.
Against this backdrop, there is a strong argument that a court's focus on
mens rea in temporary-insanity cases simply constitutes a means of
measuring whether the temporarily insane offender manifested a sufficient
"disassociation" between states of mind to support legal culpability.
Psychological theories of desert posit that a direct psychological connection
must hold between a person at one time and another to support personal
culpability;" that is, psychological disassociation determines
nonresponsibility. But in temporary-insanity cases, the legal proxy for the
"psychological connection" index is simply the ability to appreciate right
and wrong. Regardless of whether "true" psychological continuity exists,59
a judgment that the defendant lacked the capacity to distinguish right and
wrong at the time of the crime (assuming the absence of external factors
such as the schizophrenic's medicine) is a judgment that the defendant is
nonresponsible-and by extension, that she possessed insufficient
continuity of identity to support retributive punishment. Hence, legal
disassociation obtains because responsibility is nontransferable. A theory of
disassociative exception to desert, therefore, is in a sense imbedded in the
56. Stuyvesant Assocs. v. Doe, 534 A.2d 448,450 (N.J. Super. 1998) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 205-06 (1984); Rebecca Dresser,
Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REv. 395, 399 (1990).
59. Even in cases of Multiple Personality Disorder-a defense that is explicitly grounded in
the notion of psychological disassociation, see SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 47, at 9 (noting
that the American Psychological Asssociation classifies MPD as a disassociative disorder), it is by
no means clear that no psychological continuity exists among the different personalities an MPD
defendant manifests. See id. at 21-32. Indeed, in cases involving the MPD defense, the notion of
disassociative identity is more a legal construction than a psychological truth.
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very logic of mens rea analysis in temporary-insanity cases.
3. Culture and the Continuity of Personhood
Whereas in mental defect cases, courts trace the offensive behavior
back only to the defendant's mental defect as a source, the cultural defense
compels the court to look further, to identify culture as part of the root
cause of the defendant's "irrational" behavior. To return to the
internal/external organizing metaphor, nonvolitional cultural defenses seek
to demonstrate how external stimuli interfaced with the defendant's
rational, culturally-shaped mental processes.' Insofar as the reasonable
person is implicated in this process, it is clear that adding culture to the
"causal framework" resists imposition of the split-consciousness model
that arises in the context of temporary insanity. The defendant retains her
"cultural" identity during both the rational and irrational phases of her
consciousness; indeed, the cultural defense assumes a unity of identity, a
continuity of personhood linked together by culture.61
Recall that in temporary-insanity cases, as the defendant's identity
passes from its rational phase to its irrational phase, it also alternates
between the normative rubrics of sameness and difference. When the
defendant lapses into her irrational mode, she is "abnormal" -that is,
different from the rest of the general populace of reasonable persons. Yet
she becomes similar to this populace the moment she passes back into her
rational state of mind. In her rational moments the defendant is normatively
indistinguishable from any other reasonable person.62 The cultural
defendant, by way of contrast, tends to react consistently to stimuli and
situations that are inscribed by her culture with a certain significance. Her
culture has given her a habitual predisposition toward such reactions.
Employing Kaplan's idealized insanity metric is instructive here:
60. Hence, even as a threshold matter, the fact that nonvolitional cultural defenses assert that
external factors played a role in the defendant's behavior implicates some form of the reasonable
person standard, thereby precluding application of the mental defect paradigm. See supra notes
51-52 and accompanying text.
61. One might object that the mere capacity for detached consciousness and the actual
manifestation of this consciousness in fact represent two distinct mental states in the cultural
defendant. While the two mental states indeed may be analytically distinct, the cultural
defendant's "irrational" consciousness does not, strictly speaking, manifest a complete break with
the defendant's rational state-at least not in the same way that a temporarily insane defendant
claims that he breaks with his rational consciousness. Only in the former scenario does an aspect
of the defendant's normal functioning-his culture-provide an inroad to the defendant's
"irrational" behavior.
62. Thus, a defendant who is prone to temporary insanity may react differently to the same
stimuli depending on his state of mind. While he is in his "psychotic" mental state, a hypothetical
defendant might believe that a man who attempts to shake his hand is attacking him and in turn
strike the man in "self-defense." While in his rational mode, however, the same defendant may
not exhibit such an adverse reaction.
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Culture, unlike insanity, is both "physically internal" and "part of the
moral phenomenon called... the self." 63 Furthermore, in contrast to the
temporarily insane defendant, the defendant's cultural behavior is not
characterized by episodic and unpredictable occurrences. Culture
constitutes a fundamental part of her rational, everyday functioning.'
establishing a causal nexus that unifies the defendant's "psychotic" and
rational identities. By definition, other members of the defendant's culture
share her culturally influenced predisposition to commit the "offensive"
behavior. Whereas the temporarily insane offender passes through stages of
normative intracultural sameness and difference, the cultural defendant
remains in a stasis of intracultural sameness.
Cultural defenses are analytically distinct from the temporary-insanity
model precisely because the mental condition of the cultural defendant is
not temporary. Fumiko Kimura's reaction to her husband's infidelity was
not, as the defense attorneys and judge seemed to believe,6' a temporary
manifestation of a distinct mental state. Her condition was not restricted to
the time when she walked with her two children into the Pacific Ocean.
Kimura functioned under the influence of her cultural background when she
attempted to commit oyako-shinjfi as well as when she stood trial for such
behavior. Her Japanese culture should not be analogized to a parasitic
defect that must be purged in order to return the defendant to her rational
mental state. Since Kimura's behavior derived from a feature inherent in
her rational identity, she is responsible for her behavior' in a way that the
temporarily insane defendant is not. This feature-Kimura's cultural
background-functioned as the nexus between the rational and irrational
phases of her consciousness, resisting imposition of the disassociative-
identity model.
III. PROVOCATION DOCTRINE AND THE CULTURAL DEFENSE
Much of the debate over the cultural defense in the literature has
centered on the question of whether the American criminal justice system
should recognize a formalized "cultural defense."'6 7 While the major
63. KAPLAN Er AL., supra note 24, at 715.
64. Several critics have advanced arguments concerning culture's pervasive influence on
individuals. Ralph Linton, for example, writes that "[n]o matter what the method by which the
individual receives the elements of culture characteristic of his society, he is sure to internalize
most of them. This process is called enculturation. Even the most deliberately unconventional
person is unable to escape his culture to any significant degree .... " RALPH LINTON, THE TREE
OF CULTURE 39 (1955).
65. See supra notes 30-33, 36 and accompanying text.
66. By this I mean that her actions are attributable to her rational agency, not that she is
morally culpable for behavior that is not proscribed by the cultural norms of her motherland.
67. For a summary of the debate over substantive incorporation, see Chin, supra note 6, at
1097-1111; and Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American
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arguments for and against substantive "incorporation ' 6 1 of the cultural
defense have already been discussed, it bears note that many advocates of
the cultural defense believe that fashioning a distinct doctrinal addition to
existing law is the best way of introducing cultural evidence into criminal
trials.69 In making such substantive incorporation arguments, proponents of
the cultural defense expose themselves to equal protection critiques that
contend that a formalized cultural defense provides legal protection to
immigrants unavailable to members of the dominant culture.7" Ultimately,
the weakness of proposals for incorporation of the cultural defense as well
as critiques of these proposals based on antidiscrimination principles lies in
the failure of both positions to recognize the ways in which culture is
implicated in the existing criminal law. This Part makes the claim that a
mechanism for considering cultural evidence is already manifest in the
doctrine of "adequate provocation," thereby making arguments for
substantive incorporation of the cultural defense superfluous.
At the outset of this discussion, it is necessary to address the problems
implicated by an argument for recognition of cultural evidence under the
auspices of an adequate provocation doctrine that many feminist scholars
argue sanctions violence against women and represents another mechanism
of female subordination.7 According to Donna Coker, feminist literature
and clinical research on battering have demonstrated that, when offered by
abusive men, provocation claims are often "demonstrably false and rely on
a belief system that validates male control of wives and lovers."72 Victoria
Nourse observes that historically, the provocation defense manifests the
law's partial condoning of "the use of private violence to punish dancing
[with another man], traveling, and turning [one's back after sex]." 73
This Note acknowledges the force of these arguments and recognizes
the problematic status of the provocation defense as it currently stands in
the criminal law. In fact, the feminist critique of adequate provocation
doctrine in many respects tracks the antidiscrimination logic of my proposal
Criminal Justice System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"?, 99 DICK. L. Rrv. 141, 143-
44 (1994).
68. I will use the term "incorporation" to refer to the recognition of a formalized cultural
defense in the criminal law.
69. See, e.g., Renteln, supra note 29, at 496; Note, supra note 9, at 1306-07; Lyman, supra
note 10, at 98-105.
70. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who
Kill, 2 S. CAL. Rav. L. & WoMEN's STUD. 71, 94, 101 (1992); Nourse, supra note 37, at 1364-
65; Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion
Manslaughter andImperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1689-92 (1986).
72. Coker, supra note 71, at 94.
73. Nourse, supra note 37, at 1364. For analogous arguments that recognition of a cultural
defense will undermine progress women have made in this country, see, Coleman, supra note 11,
at 1097; and Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of
Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231,251 (1994).
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for a limited recognition of cultural evidence in criminal trials. Feminists
essentially charge that the provocation defense has historically been
selectively available to men and therefore registers an adversely
disproportionate impact on women. No argument advanced here should be
construed to advocate the preservation of the provocation defense in a
gender-discriminatory form. However, while the concerns raised by
feminists may demonstrate that yoking together provocation and culture
admittedly places the latter defense on somewhat unsteady ground, these
arguments do not, in my view, make a compelling case for the wholesale
retirement of the provocation defense. After all, as Nourse pointedly asks, if
provocation is abolished, how will the law deal with a figure who feminists
agree deserves our compassion-such as a "woman who, distraught and
enraged, kills her stalker, her rapist, or her batterer?" 74
That the provocation doctrine has its historical roots in a value system
that embraced the oppression of women75 does not preclude a reformed,
gender-egalitarian model of adequate provocation. Even Nourse, who is
acutely aware of the discriminatory aspects of provocation doctrine,76
believes that it is possible for the law to recognize in a nondiscriminatory
manner certain circumstances in which a reasonable person may be
provoked to behave illegally. 7 Furthermore, there is at least some evidence
that the concept of legal provocation may be slowly evolving to eschew its
gender discriminatory roots and manifest a greater sensitivity to the ways in
which women are reasonably provoked.
Consider, for example, the well-publicized acquittal of Lorena Bobbitt
for severing her husband's penis.78 Although Bobbitt was acquitted on the
grounds of insanity, a number of commentators have observed that the
analysis of the defendant's mental state distilled to the issue of whether
Lorena Bobbitt was sufficiently provoked.79 Other signs of reform include
74. Nourse, supra note 37, at 1390.
75. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
76. See Nourse, supra note 37, at 1364.
77. Although a vigorous critic of the gender bias historically manifest in provocation
doctrine, Nourse concedes that there is a need for the law to excuse defendants whose emotion
"reflects the outrage of one responding to a grave wrong," id. at 1390; she thus seeks to
"reconstruct, rather than abolish, the [provocation] defense," id. at 1389. In her proposal for a
more gender-equitable model of provocation, Nourse contends that the heat of passion defense
"should be retained as a partial excuse but only in the limited set of cases in which the defendant
and the victim stand on an equal emotional and normative plane." I. at 1337.
78. See David Margolick, Lorena Bobbitt Acquitted in Mutilation of Husband, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1994, at Al.
79. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality
Check, 5 CORNELL J. L & PUB. POL'Y 1, 11-12 (1995) ("The case was packaged as an insanity
case. Yet, beneath the dispute about Lorena Bobbitt's mental condition was a story about John
Bobbitt's provocation and about Lorena Bobbitt's rage. In the final analysis, the case was about
whether she can fairly be blamed for retaliating against him."); Naomi Mezey, Book Note, Legal
Radicals in Madonna's Closet: The Influence of Identity Politics, Popular Culture, and a New
Generation on Critical Legal Studies, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1835, 1861 n.128 (1994) (reviewing
1999] 1865
The Yale Law Journal
courts' growing receptiveness to so-called "Battered Women's Syndrome"
(BWS) defenses-raised in conjunction with either a self-defense or
provocation plea. In BWS-provocation cases tried in Model Penal Code
(MPC) jurisdictions, courts have determined that a history of abuse,
irrespective of whether the crime took place in a direct confrontational
situation, may provide a partial excuse for battered women who murder
their spouses.8" Against this backdrop, this Note takes a cue from
commentators such as Nourse, conditioning its proposal for a synthetic
vision of cultural influence and provocation on continued progress toward
reform of the provocation defense through the retirement of outdated
masculinist values and the incorporation of more egalitarian gender norms
into the doctrine.
Critics might still argue that the cultural defense represents a
retrenchment of whatever progress provocation has made since it
(re)introduces "backward" gender norms into the criminal law. It bears
note, however, that if courts chose to restrict cultural defenses
predominately to the provocation context, the number of successful cultural
claims would likely decrease in a way that would serve the interests of
feminist critics. Restricting recognition of cultural claims to instances in
which the defendant's cultural background caused him to fly into an
uncontrolled heat of passion would produce a gatekeeping effect, excluding
cultural defenses based on volitional behavior. This rule would in turn
diminish the danger that defendants would abuse the cultural defense by
employing it to circumvent the general rule that ignorance of the law is no
defense."1 Such a doctrine would advance feminist concerns by effectively
precluding defenses based on foreign "rape rituals," 82 illegal female genital
cutting,83 and other volitional practices held to be mysogynistic.
DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLrTICS OF CULTURAL
IDENTITY (1993)) ("Lorena Bobbitt... demonstrates how changing narratives of gender and
abuse can change the law. Where the law previously excused men for sexual abuse on the grounds
of provocation, women may now be able to invoke the same theory, arguing that men provoke
sexual violence (even castration), if they repeatedly abuse women.").
80. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782 (Pa. 1989) (ruling that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek instruction on "cumulative provocation" in a
case where a woman was harassed and stalked over a period of time and then killed her ex-
boyfriend). Pennsylvania has adopted a cumulative provocation rule similar to the one in the
MPC. But note that judicial receptiveness to cumulative provocation may not always benefit
women. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (reversing the murder conviction of a
man who had killed his wife after a "cumulative series of provocations"). For a discussion of how
the MPC formulation of provocation permits claims based on emotional grievances that grow over
time, see Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591,601 (1981).
81. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 52, § 5.1(d), at 412-14.
82. See generally Evans-Pritchard & Renteln, supra note 18.
83. See Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 8 U.S.C.A § 1374(c) (West
Supp. 1997) (defining female genital mutiliation (FGM)); 18 U.S.C.A § 116(a) (West Supp. 1997)
(prohibiting FGM and providing for the punishment of anyone who engages in its practice); Karen
Hughes, The Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation in the United States, 4 J.L. & POL'Y
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A. Common-Law Roots of Provocation
In his historical account of the provocation doctrine, Jeremy Horder
observes how provocation as a mitigating defense in the criminal law has its
roots in the sixteenth-century English conception of "natural honour."84
Horder describes "natural honour" as
the good opinion of others founded in the assumption that the person
honoured by the good opinion was morally worthy of such esteem
and respect. It was distinguished from acquired honour by the fact
that, whereas acquired honour had positively to be earned, natural
honour was established negatively: it was simply one's due if one
had not failed in any principle virtue (principally courage)."
In English society, a man was bound by a code of honor that strictly
defined the parameters of appropriate behavior during particular forms of
social intercourse. Since the protection of a man's "natural honor" was
contingent on his conformity to this behavior, the honor code was much
more pervasive and influential than the loose rules of etiquette that structure
modem society. "Men of honour"-men who took their natural honor
seriously-were expected to retaliate swiftly and forcefully in the face of an
affront.86 The act of retaliation, regardless of the consequences, would
negate the threat to honor. "What is more," explains Horder, "[the man of
honor] was not expected to retaliate reluctantly .... He was expected to
resent the affront, and to retaliate in anger." 7
Anger, rage, and retaliatory measures, then, were culturally
programmed reactions, "implanted" in the psyches of sixteenth-century
English males as not only justifiable, but also obligatory courses of action.
To the extent that men of honor believed retaliatory actions were the direct
functions of courage, retaliatory "boxes on the ear," fist fights, and even
duels were encouraged in English society." Moreover, the code of honor
did not simply dictate that men were obliged to engage in some form of
ambiguous "angered retaliation"; the form of retaliation was strictly
regulated by culturally defined principles of proportionality. These rules of
proportionality, as well as the principle of natural honor they reflected,
were explicitly embodied in early-modem manslaughter laws.
At common law, courts would not perfunctorily reduce a defendant's
321, 326-27 (1995) (arguing against a cultural defense to FGM). For a discussion of the debate
surrounding symbolic female genital cutting, see Dorianne Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle
Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717 (1998).
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murder charge to manslaughter if he demonstrated that he responded in
"hot blood" to an affront to his natural honor. During the sixteenth century,
the common law developed a set of four categories of provocation that
legally embodied these principles of proportional retaliation. 9 These four
categories were: (1) grossly insulting assault; (2) witnessing a friend,
relative, or kinsman being attacked; (3) "seeing an Englishman unlawfully
deprived of his liberty" ;90 and (4) catching a man in the act of adultery with
one's wife. If it was determined that a defendant retaliated with deadly
force after having been subjected to any of the four provocations, his
murder charge was usually reduced to manslaughter.
For the purposes of this analysis, it bears note that the fourth category
was widely regarded as the most serious provocation. The court in Regina
v. Mawgridge91 indicated that there was no higher offense to a man's
natural honor.9" Adultery was considered such a serious provocation in part
because of society's treatment of women as chattel. Such sentiment is
clearly revealed in Chief Judge Holt's remarks in the Mawgridge case,
which analogize adultery to the invasion of property and material theft:
[W]hen a man is taken in adultery.., with another man's wife, if the
husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock out his brains, this is bare
manslaughter: for.., adultery is the highest invasion of
property ....
If a thief comes to rob another, it is lawful to kill him. And if a
man comes to rob a man's posterity and his family, yet to kill him is
manslaughter. So is the law though it may seem hard, that the killing
in the one case should not be as justifiable as the other.93
This view of women as property led to the development of an implicit
addendum to the fourth category of provocation. As many feminist writers
have observed, judges have historically reduced charges against a defendant
who murdered his wife if he could establish that he discovered her in
flagrante delicto.94
B. Revival of the Common Law: Emotion as the Embodiment of Reason in
the Provocation and Cultural Defenses
Provocation doctrine has historically recognized that there are aspects
89. See id. at 24, 30-40.
90. Id. at 24.
91. 84 Eng. Rep. 1107 (KB. 1707).
92. See id. at 1115 ("A man cannot receive a higher provocation.").
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 6, at 1114 ("The classic Anglo-American manslaughter
paradigm is that of the husband catching his wife inflagrante delicto and killing her, or her lover,
or both.").
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of our cultural background and history that may cause reasonable people to
behave in ways that are offensive to the criminal legal system. Horder's
historical account of provocation reveals that the provocation doctrine is, in
essence, a dominant cultural defense. The provocation defense makes
allowances for the ways in which reasonable people are influenced and
compelled by dominant cultural conceptions of natural honor. That early
provocation defenses did not include the concepts of loss of self-control or
lapse into irrationality-the organizing principles of the modem
provocation doctrine-substantiates this "cultural" interpretation. It bears
emphasis that a "hot-blooded" reaction was regarded as natural by the
early modem code of honor, and did not correspond necessarily with a loss
of rationality.
Recently, contemporary critics have returned to the early modem
suggestion that emotion and reason are tightly linked to advance a
"reconceptualization" of the provocation defense. Victoria Nourse, for
example, observes that the conventional liberal conception of emotion and
reason as "natural enemies" has been seriously challenged by a host of
scientists, academicians, and legal critics.95 Provocation doctrine, argues
Nourse, insofar as it inquires into the circumstances of retaliation, is in fact
fundamentally at odds with the conventional liberal view:
When we distinguish [women who kill their rapists] from [men who
kill their departing wives], we acknowledge a very different view of
emotion, one in which emotion is imbued with meaning. Both the
departing wife killer and the rapist killer may be upset, but the
meanings embodied in their claims for emotional understanding are
quite different. In distinguishing these cases based on the reasons for
the claimed emotion, we acknowledge a view of emotion in which
emotion is not the enemy of reason but, instead, its embodiment.96
When a defendant claims that his actions were impelled by extreme
emotion, the provocation defense "expects reasons, and they are typically
attributions of wrongdoing and blame.... No form of the defense excuses,
even partially, based on emotion alone." 97
Against this backdrop, it should come as little surprise that there was no
mention in common-law provocation cases or contemporaneous
commentary of the modem notion of "loss of self-control" or "heat of
95. See Nourse, supra note 37, at 1391. Nourse observes that the conception of emotion and
reason as perfectly compatible is more consistent with the courts' practice of reading a reasonable
person standard into heat-of-passion claims. See id. at 1339.
96. lId at 1390. For a parallel observation that the Aristotelian ideal of emotion was bound up
with reasonable judgment, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 290-91 (1996). See also RONALD DE SOUSA,
THE RATIONALITY OF EMOnON 107-11 (1987) (arguing that reason and emotion are not distinct).
97. Nourse, supra note 37, at 1391.
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passion."9" Such notions were alien to the early-modem law precisely
because such law was founded on a "quite different conception of anger.""
Provocation during this period was much more akin to a justification
defense analogous to self-defense or necessity, suggesting that the
defendant should have acted as he did. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries (and, Victoria Nourse argues, in the modem era), retaliatory
measures were not viewed as the byproduct of a "temporarily irrational"
state of mind. Hence, there is a strong argument that the defendant who
retaliated in order to preserve his natural honor was eminently rational.
After all, who is the descendant of the "man of honour" but the modem
reasonable man?
Acting in accord with the code of honor reflects not a loss of reason,
but rather conformity to its dictates. 1' ° A true loss of reason in this light is
inseparable from the notion of defect, and would suggest that the
defendant's rage caused him to act in ways that were inconsistent with
dominant cultural and legal norms-in a way that would mark him as
different or abnormal. Retaliating in an appropriate manner after having
been provoked, in contrast, implicates a profound sense of normative
sameness. The defendant who raises a provocation defense points to the
central significance of external factors,101 arguing that he behaved in a way
that any "man of honour" should have acted, or in the language of the
modem doctrine, the way any reasonable person would have acted. As I
shall argue, this is essentially the same argument asserted by the defendant
who raises a cultural defense.
C. A Challenge from the Model Penal Code?
Critics might point out that the historical roots of provocation doctrine
provide no guarantee that the model of emotion functioning as the
embodiment of reason obtains in the modem context. In particular, the
Model Penal Code's adoption of the "extreme emotional disturbance"
(EED) test 2 appears to call into question the applicability of any
reasonability standard to emotional outbursts, and to blur the boundaries
between the insanity and provocation defenses. Under the EED test, a crime
constitutes manslaughter if "committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation
or excuse." 0 3 The MPC approach, requiring that reasonableness be
98. HORDER, supra note 84, at 42.
99. Id.
100. See Nourse, supra note 37, at 1390.
101. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
102. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3(1)(b) (1980).
103. Id.
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assessed "from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be," 104 establishes a much more
subjective rule, abandoning the common-law provocation defense's strict
per se requirements. In addition, by explicitly employing the language of
"mental... disturbance," the EED rule appears to adopt elements of a
mental defect model of defense.105
But the MPC commentary on the EED rule, focusing heavily on the
"situational" element incorporated into the section,0 6 makes clear that the
EED test remains analytically distinct from the mental defect paradigm, at
least with respect to the potential challenge EED poses to a synthetic view
of culture and provocation. The commentary reads in pertinent part:
[I]t is clear that.., some external circumstances must be taken into
account. Thus, blindness, shock from traumatic injury, and extreme
grief are all easily read into the term "situation." This result is
sound, for it would be morally obtuse to appraise a crime for
mitigation of punishment without reference to these factors.... [I]t
is equally plain that idiosyncratic moral values are not part of the
actor's situation. An assassin who kills a political leader because he
believes it is right to do so cannot ask that he be judged by the
standard of a reasonable extremist.0 7
While it is tempting to assume that the EED rule throws the focus of the
provocation defense exclusively on the mental element of the crime, the
commentary contravenes this interpretation. The drafters of MPC section
210.3 indicate that it is still necessary to look back further than the mere
manifestation of the mental or emotional disturbance in order to determine
whether the defendant is eligible for a manslaughter charge. While the
common law's restrictive categories of provocation have been retired and
the sufficiency of provocation is now judged from the standpoint of the
defendant, an "outer-bounds" objective component is nevertheless retained
in the MPC rule.'
The "subjective" element that the EED test introduces is an expansion,
104. Id.
105. For a theory of how the EED approach incorporates a "partial insanity" test, see Judd F.
Sneirson, Black Rage and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to a Polarized Debate, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 2251, 2284-85 (1995). But see Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principals for the
Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 19, 28 n.31 (1987) (citing State v. Ott, 686
P.2d 1001 (Or. 1984), for the proposition that EED is merely a "broader modem version of heat
of passion and provocation").
106. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3.
107. Id.
108. See Rebecca Dresser, Culpability and Other Minds, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 55
(1993). While commenting that the MPC standard evidences a subjectivization of the reasonable
person standard, Professor Dresser indicates that ascertaining how the individual defendant
experienced her situation nevertheless retains an objective component. See id.
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but not a complete repudiation, of the parameters of the reasonability
requirement. Significantly, that the MPC formulation remains rooted in the
reasonable person standard even while it requires greater sensitivity to the
defendant's subjective position clearly implicates the principle of
intracultural sameness.1°9 Although we are accustomed to believe that
"mental or emotional disturbance" is definitionally aberrant, such
disturbance in fact reflects normative difference only if reasonable persons
similarly situated to the defendant would not have become disturbed. A
defense of mental defect, as I have attempted to show, does not for the most
part take cognizance of the root cause of the defendant's aberrant behavior
(i.e., the cause of the mental defect),1 reflecting an assumption of
intracultural difference. If courts were to recognize that the cause of the
defendant's behavior would have produced a similar reaction in a
reasonable person, the reaction would, by definition, not be aberrant or
insane.
Finally, to the extent that the EED test does broaden the traditional heat
of passion doctrine, it directly supports judicial recognition of cultural
evidence. If reasonability under the MPC scheme is at least partly a
function of the "circumstances as [the defendant] believes them to be,"
then courts must recognize that any given stimulus or "fact pattern" will be
imbued with different meanings depending on the defendant's beliefs and
background."' While the commentary makes clear that fringe or
idiosyncratic moral values must still be excluded, the MPC nevertheless
directs courts to give greater deference to a defendant's belief system-
including, by extension, its moorings to a particular set of cultural norms-
that may make the circumstances to which he was subjected provocative.
The MPC thus takes cognizance of the way in which social meaning and
social reality is constructed by a defendant's system of beliefs. The EED
rule makes clear that there exist no objectively provocative stimuli even
while it insists that the interests of social order dictate that the law must
patrol a limited domain of "objectively" nonprovocative circumstances-
i.e., those circumstances that only "extremists" find provocative. But as
long as the defendant's beliefs fall into a broadened (though still delimited)
realm of normalcy, the MPC does not question why the defendant may
believe particular circumstances are reasonably provocative.
D. Provocation's Link with Culture: Familiar and Unfamiliar Emotions
In both EED and traditional provocation jurisdictions, the defendant's
109. For an explanation of this principle, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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emotionally charged response represents an essential part of his moral self,
not the manifestation of a medical condition or psychological defect.
Regardless of whether the defendant lost self-control or manifested an
extreme emotional disturbance, that courts "look back" to the
external/cultural causes of the defendant's behavior (and consider whether
rational individuals would respond similarly) indicates that the "trigger"
for the defendant's behavior may reside in her rational consciousness.
Under this interpretation, the EED rule establishes a direct nexus with the
common-law tradition."' That external factors and the reasonable person
standard have remained central components of provocation doctrine
throughout its various historical permutations supports the view that all
forms of provocation-like the cultural defense-assume a unity of
personhood. Thus, the model of the defendant's identity generated by both
the EED and provocation defenses is virtually identical to the one that
emerges in the context of the cultural defense. Courts do not believe that the
defendant who asserts either a provocation or EED defense is properly
understood as embodying two distinct mental states; if courts consider the
question of provocation (or culture) at all they necessarily assume that the
defendant manifests a continuity of identity.
Provocation, then, provides the most appropriate framework for cultural
arguments because the doctrine is rooted in the fundamental unity of
rational behavior and emotional influence." 3 If, as I have argued, cultural
arguments necessarily claim that the defendant's emotionally charged
behavior is reasonable, the same dynamics that imbue emotion with
meaning in the provocation context are also at play in cultural defense
claims." '4 In other words, the Kimura court was willing to grant leniency to
a Japanese woman who attempted to commit oyako-shinjg based on the
same principle by which we distinguish a woman who kills her rapist from
the man who murders his departing wife in Victoria Nourse's example.
In the provocation context, as Nourse observes, we acknowledge that 1)
emotion is inscribed with meaning; and 2) the nature of the provocation
determines the emotion's meaning (and rationality). In the cultural defense
context, we are willing to consider whether foreign culture inscribes within
the emotion experienced by the cultural defendant a certain meaning that
112. See HORDER, supra note 84, at 40-42.
113. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
114. One might argue that defenses such as necessity and self-defense also involve external
factors that implicate the reasonable person standard, and that the provocation and cultural
defenses are therefore not as uniquely well-matched as I claim. However, because necessity and
self-defense do not focus on the actus reus (voluntary act) element of the crime, they do not
implicate the same nonvolitional component that lies at the heart of adequate provocation. See
LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 52, § 5.4, at 441-43; § 5.7, at 454-55. Defendants who raise other
"reasonable person" -based defenses do not claim that they were overtaken by emotion or acted in
a heat of passion. Thus, only provocation doctrine accommodates the nonvolitional cultural
defendant's argument that his behavior was at once emotionally-charged and rational.
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makes the emotion rational. It bears emphasis that what distinguishes the
provocation and cultural defenses is the familiarity-but not necessarily the
rationality-of the meaning of the claimed emotion. While considering
"domestic" provocation claims, courts may make direct determinations as
to the reasonability of emotions that are familiar to the Anglo-American
cultural consciousness. But they must engage in a more probing inquiry
when presented with the "unfamiliar" meanings that attach to emotions
claimed by cultural defendants.
Analysis of the reason/emotion dynamic reveals a deep sense in which
provocation and nonvolitional cultural claims may in fact be subspecies of
the same defense. Both provocation and cultural claims assert not only that
the defendant's behavior is a product of rational and organic mental
processes, but that such processes are informed by the defendant's cultural
background. The provocation defense recognizes that the defendant has
been influenced by the dominant culture to react in a certain manner to
various affronts. Although she may have lost self-control, the defendant
behaved in the same manner as any other similarly situated reasonable
person. Since the dominant culture planted the seeds of the defendant's
"extreme emotion" and in some sense constitutes the source of her action,
the criminal system cannot conceive of her behavior-even if committed in
a "detached" state-as committed by an irrational alter ego. The
provocation defendant's actions are excusable not because we chalk them
up to a separate consciousness, but rather because they were culturally
influenced and therefore rational.
Finally, turning back to the Kimura case, it is necessary to briefly
address one of the practical implications of treating the cultural and
provocation defenses as fraternal twins. In particular, a synthesized
provocation/cultural defense would have to be reconciled with the
"misdirected retaliation" limitation on the provocation defense.
Jurisdictions that incorporate this doctrine refuse to recognize provocation
if the victims were known by the defendant not to be the provoking parties,
on the theory that the victims did not deserve the provoked retaliation.'
Hence, a court might take into account that Kimura's victims-her two
children-were clearly not the source of the provocation and reject outright
the defendant's provocation claim. There is a strong argument, however,
that a cultural/provocation defense would trump the misdirected retaliation
bar since the primary justification for misdirected retaliation-the notion
that reasonable people would not under any circumstances harm innocent
115. See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law
Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1216 (1994); R.S. O'Regan, Indirect
Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation, 1968 CRIM. L. REV. 319; see also State v. Tilson, 503
S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1974) (refusing to allow manslaughter where the defendant killed a
bystander).
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third parties even when provoked l6-is itself a culturally contingent
concept. This position finds support in the Model Penal Code, which
explicitly rejects a misdirected retaliation limitation on provocation on the
ground that the moral status of the victim is not necessarily a function of the
moral desert of the provoked defendant." 7 Under the logic of the MPC,
then, even in Anglo-American cultures, a reasonable person might lash out
at an innocent third party if adequately provoked.
E. Cultural Symmetry and Provocation: People v. Chen
People v. Chen,"' a cultural defense case involving spousal infidelity,
nicely illustrates the manifest symmetries between provocation doctrine and
the cultural defense. The defendant, Dong Lu Chen, was charged with
murder when he beat his wife to death with a hammer after she informed
him she had been having an affair. At trial, the defense introduced expert
testimony on how in traditional Chinese culture, "a wife's adultery is proof
that her husband has a weak character." 119 Furthermore, argued the defense,
"[marriage] is a sacred institution in China .... When there is this kind of
situation, the attendant shame and humiliation is [sic] magnified a
thousandfold." 120 The judge subsequently found that the defendant was
"driven to violence by traditional Chinese values about adultery and loss of
manhood," 121 and reduced his charge to second-degree manslaughter.
Like the judge in the Kimura case, the Chen court attempted to interpret
the cultural evidence under the rubric of temporary insanity; hence, culture
was "something that made [the defendant] crack more easily. That was the
factor, the cracking factor." 122 The judge claimed that "[c]ulture was never
an excuse," 1 but was useful merely in showing the defendant's state of
mind on the night of the crime. This vision of the cultural defense, however,
116. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 52, at § 7.10(g), at 664.
117. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, at 61.
118. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 1989) (unpublished decision). For descriptions of
the Chen case, see Kim, supra note 29, at 119-21; Leslie Gevirtz, Immigrant Gets Probation for
Killing Wife, UPI, Mar. 31, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Alexis Jetter, Fear
Is Legacy of Wife Killing in Chinatown, NEWSDAY, Nov. 27, 1989, at 4; Nina Schuyler, Cultural
Defense: Equality or Anarchy?, S.F. WKLY., Sept. 25, 1991, at 12; and Marianne Yen, Refusal To
Jail Immigrant Who Killed Wife Stirs Outrage; Judge Ordered Probation for Chinese Man, Citing
His 'Cultural Background,' WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1989, at A3.
119. Kim, supra note 29, at 120.
120. Gevirtz, supra note 118 (quoting defense attorney Stewart Orden).
121. Jetter, supra note 118, at4 (quoting Judge Edward Pincus).
122. Celestine Bohlen, Holtzman May Appeal Probation for Immigrant in Wife's Slaying,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1989, at B3 (quoting Judge Edward Pincus).
123. IL (emphasis added). Clearly, the court did not wish to suggest that the defendant was
not raising an excuse-based criminal defense, for insanity is usually classified as a form of
"excuse." See KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 715. Instead, the court meant that the defendant's
cultural background did not make his behavior directly excusable, but rather was useful merely in
shedding light on the excuse of a "cracked" mental state.
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improperly subsumed culture under the rubric of temporary mental defect.
As this Note has shown in the context of Kimura, evidence of the
defendant's cultural background cannot logically be restricted to a
probative function with respect to mens rea. Cultural evidence, insofar as it
is incompatible with the division of the defendant into two mental states,
becomes meaningful only if the court assumes a certain degree of
rationality on the part of the defendant during the commission of the crime.
Thus, if culture is relevant in demonstrating some form of diminished
capacity or loss of self-control, it necessarily implicates the specter of the
"foreign" reasonable person, and therefore provides the defendant with an
excuse. If, as the Chen court determined, the defendant's culture made him
more likely to lose self-control, then presumably the other reasonable
members of the defendant's culture possess a similar susceptibility. 4
Implicit in the defense's presentation of cultural evidence was the notion
that similarly situated persons with a Chinese cultural background might
have reacted in the same way if faced with the same circumstances. This
conception implicates a profound "sameness" that the defendant and other
members of his culture share, which in turn qualifies the defendant's
actions as perfectly reasonable. Although neither the defense nor the court
made any mention of the provocation doctrine, this crucial element of
intracultural sameness reveals that the court in essence ruled that Dong Lu
Chen was provoked into killing his wife and that the crime was therefore
excusable. While the Chen court suggested that cultural evidence was
useful only in establishing insanity, I would suggest that it instead
necessarily served to shed light on how the defendant was provoked.
Recall that the historical roots of the provocation defense reveal that the
common law recognized how a Western man is acculturated to respond in
angry retaliation at witnessing his wife's infidelity."as In excusing a male
defendant who killed his wife or his wife's lover, the fourth category of
provocation recognized that dominant Western culture associates adultery
with a profound loss of honor and manhood.'26 Of course, the Chen court
made essentially identical observations on the influences of "foreign"
124. A determination of a "foreign" reasonable person standard was indeed a significant
aspect of the defense strategy. One witness for the defense, a cultural anthropologist, when asked
whether the defendant's behavior was consistent with reactions under "normal [cultural]
conditions for people from Mainland China" responded:
[Tihe events that you have described, the reactions that you have described would not be
unusual at all for Chinese in that situation, for a normal Chinese in that situation.... [I]t's
not the United States, [a normal Chinese person] would react very violently. They might
very well have confusion. It would be very likely to be a chaotic situation.
Volpp, supra note 34, at 65. The expert then contrasted this normal Chinese person with the
American "reasonable person": "In general terms, I think that one could expect a Chinese to react
in a much more volatile, violent way to those circumstances than someone from our own society."
Id. at66.
125. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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culture on the defendant's behavior. The defense's lengthy explanation of
the different ways in which an American and a Mainland Chinese
individual might respond to the events that resulted in Mrs. Chen's death is
especially ironic in this light. In the end analysis, the judge fixated not on
cultural difference, but rather on perceived symmetries between the
American and Chinese cultural systems.
As Daina Chiu argues, the Chen court was willing to grant leniency to a
defendant because his "cultural" action was similar to dominant American
cultural behavior.27 Only to the extent that the defendant's actions
resonated with dominant cultural sensibilities-and were therefore familiar
and cognizable-was the court willing to extend sympathy to the defendant.
In turn, such a fixation on cultural symmetry suppressed the possibility that
Chen's actions may not have been culturally typical, and thus likely caused
the court to rely on racial stereotypes and antiempirical assumptions in
identifying the defendant's cultural values. While the problem of accurately
identifying foreign cultural norms falls outside the scope of this analysis,
the court's clear implication that contemporary Chinese culture would in
fact excuse the defendant's behavior (in the same way that early modem
English culture excused such behavior) is, as other critics have observed,
dubious at best.1 2 In any case, that the court's decision coincided with the
cultural sensibilities contained in the common law's "fourth category"
reveals the way in which Chen, and indeed, all nonvolitional cultural
claims, lend themselves to analysis under the provocation rubric.
IV. ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The abolition of the disparate application of the criminal laws was one
of the primary concerns of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Senator Howard, speaking during the Senate debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment, observed that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
"abolish[] all class legislation in the States and do [] away with the injustice
of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.... It
protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same
shield which it throws over the white man.""2 9 With the ratification of the
127. See Chiu, supra note 6, at 1113-14.
128. See, e.g., Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses from
the Battered Women's Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 171-72
(1996).
129. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 314 (1990) (quoting Senator Jacob Howard's presentation of a joint resolution on
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted partly in order
to do away with a bifurcated criminal system in which a white defendant was punishable under
the general code, and a black defendant was punishable under the more severe "Black Code." For
a description of the emergence of the Black Codes, see MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW
OF SLAVERY, 1810-1960: CONSIDERATIONS OF HuMrANrrY AND INTEREST 71, 156 (198 1).
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Fourteenth Amendment, the selective denial of the government's protection
to disfavored minorities was rendered unconstitutional. 30 Commentators
have subsequently observed that the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses embody an "antidiscrimination principle" guaranteeing that similar
individuals will be accorded similar treatment by the government.
13
'
A. A Critique of the Equal Protection Critique: Due Process, the
Antidiscrimination Principle, and Recognition of Difference
As previously discussed, Doriane Lambelet Coleman has argued that
the antidiscrimination principle counsels against the admission of cultural
evidence in criminal trials. Coleman contends that incorporation of a
substantive cultural defense will lead to special treatment of immigrant
groups and will result in discrimination against those who do not belong to
the foreign or "cultured" class.' 32 Coleman believes that a cultural defense
in any guise would represent "special treatment" that is afforded to foreign
defendants. Under this theory, recognizing a cultural defense would create
an entire criminal law defense doctrine that is selectively denied to
members of the dominant cultural group, thus violating the
antidiscrimination principle.
33
The most glaring flaw in Coleman's critique of the cultural defense is
her assumption that "strict incorporation" is the only means of recognizing
a cultural defense in the criminal law. If, however, the provocation defense
is in essence a dominant-cultural defense, then denying foreign defendants
the right to introduce cultural evidence effectively denies them use of the
provocation doctrine. In this light, refusing to admit cultural evidence at
trial, because it is "taking [individuals] who are different and treating them
the same," 34 jeopardizes cultural defendants' rights to due process and
equality before the law. 3 1 Consider, in this light, that courts have ruled that
130. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989).
131. For a more thorough account of the antidiscrimination principle, see Paul Brest,
Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1976).
132. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 1141-45.
133. See id. at 1144.
134. ANCHETA, supra note 1, at 105 (citation omitted) (quoting Edward Steinman).
135. To say that the categorical exclusion of cultural evidence undermines principles of
equality is not to suggest that the cultural defense is mandated by the Equal Protection Clause.
Although inhibiting a class of individuals from raising a criminal defense seems intuitively to
establish an equal protection violation, I concede that an equal protection challenge based on the
cultural defense is problematic on a doctrinal level. First, any jurisdiction's manslaughter laws,
even if they make the provocation defense available only to members of the dominant culture, are
facially neutral and do not categorically exclude any class of individuals. On this account, even if,
arguendo, culture-based distinctions were accorded heightened scrutiny (by mapping such
distinctions onto national-origin based classifications, for example), manslaughter laws-and all
modem criminal defense doctrines, for that matter-do not explicitly make use of suspect culture-
based classifications. The unavailability of provocation to cultural defendants would be treated as
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proceedings preventing a jury from considering a relevant defense doctrine
violate a defendant's rights to due process and a fair trial.'36 In addition, the
Supreme Court has held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 137
Subsequently, the Court determined that the prosecution must prove the
absence of provocation in malice murder cases. 38 When a statute or judge
presumes malice-the fact necessary to constitute murder-and requires the
defendant to rebut the presumption by establishing provocation by a
preponderance of the evidence, it contravenes the Due Process Clause 3 9 It
follows that when a defendant lacks meaningful opportunity even to
provide evidence of provocation, the Fourteenth Amendments is similarly
violated.Y If a defendant's provocation is categorically noncognizable by
the court, the prosecution's burden of establishing the absence of
provocation is no burden at all. Such "noncognizability" represents a
graver constitutional harm than even a rebuttable malice presumption, for it
translates in essence into an irrebuttable determination of malice.
Since the provocation defense in this scenario would in effect be
available only to members of the dominant culture, the antidiscrimination
principle does not preclude the recognition of cultural evidence, but instead
militates in its favor. The legal double standards that critics like Coleman
envisage would result not (as they contend) from judicial consideration of
the cultural evidence, but rather from the categorical exclusion of such
evidence from the courtroom. This analysis demonstrates that recognizing
a disparate impact, an instance of de facto discrimination that must be subjected to the "intent
requirement" test. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a discriminatory
purpose is necessary to establish an equal protection violation and that a disparate racial impact
cannot by itself prove such a purpose).
It is important to note, however, that a legal remedy need not be compelled by the Equal
Protection Clause to serve the goals of the antidiscrimination principle. After all, statutes such as
Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act are presumably neither mandated nor proscribed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, yet there is little doubt that such laws are instruments of the
antidscrimination principle, see infra note 147-148, 155-158 and accompanying text. This Note
attempts to cast a culturally sensitive manslaughter rule in a similar light-as a doctrine whose
necessity is pressed more effectively along due process rather than equal protection lines, but that
nevertheless advances legal equality. For an argument that the recognition of difference-to the
extent that it is necessary to achieve legal equality-is precisely what is required by the
antidiscrimination principle, see infra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 516 N.E. 1292 (M1. App. Ct. 1987); Ohio v. Sanders, 98
648 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
137. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
138. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
139. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215-16 (1977).
140. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations."); see also, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 363-64 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (pointing out that the deprivation of a defendant's right to have the provocation
defense considered by a jury significantly reduced the likelihood of an accurate murder conviction
and constituted a due process violation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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the influence of foreign culture on criminal defendants need not take the
form of substantive incorporation to produce equitable results. Instead,
courts should simply take notice of the manifest linkages between
provocation doctrine and the cultural defense. Critics may contend that
"supplementing" a provocation claim with cultural evidence gives special
treatment to foreign defendants. 41 However, the synthetic vision of
provocation and culture circumvents "dual system" critiques by providing
cultural defendants with the same protection-through the same doctrinal
mechanisms-that is afforded members of the dominant group.'42
B. Some Final Thoughts on "Equal Rights vs. Special Rights" and the
Cultural Defense
The affrmnative thrust of my argument has been that the failure to
recognize cultural evidence in cases involving nonvolitional behavior
violates norms of procedural fairness and betrays the spirit of the
antidiscrimination principle. My defensive strategy maintains that the
proposed solution-an integrated culture-provocation defense-would not
itself be constitutionally suspect. Central to the latter claim is the difference
between laws that secure equal rights and those that grant special rights.
1 43
In fact, it is readily apparent that Coleman's attack on the cultural defense
as a special right is part of the larger backlash against antidiscrimination
measures that some critics believe grant preferential treatment and should
therefore be subject to heightened scrutiny. But like antidiscrimination
statutes, a criminal-defense doctrine that recognizes group-based
differences in order to prevent discrimination is not the equivalent (as
Coleman's argument implies) of a state action that grants preferences to
141. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 1141-44.
142. This integrated view of culture and provocation is also responsive to critics who claim
that the cultural defense violates the Equal Protection Clause because it sends the message that
victims of cultural crimes are less worthy of protection than victims who are members of the
dominant culture since it failed to "vindicate" them in the same way it would have had they (and
the defendant) not been foreign. See id. at 1141. Consider the "victim-centered" equal protection
critique-assuming for a moment that the Kimura court had subsumed the defendant's cultural
defense under the provocation doctrine and subsequently reduced her charge to manslaughter. In
this scenario, it is clear that the relevant comparison is not, to use Coleman's example, between
Kimura's children and Susan Smith's children (whose mother was not adequately provoked), but
rather between Kimura's children and any other innocent third-party victims of "heat of passion"
crimes tried in a jurisdiction that does not incorporate a misdirected retaliation rule. That Kimura
and Susan Smith received different degrees of punishment by no means establishes ipso facto that
the criminal law provides unequal levels of protection to their victims.
143. Richard H. Pildes argues that the distinction between equal rights and preferential
treatment has evolved into one of the "philosophical touchstones of the current Court's
constitutional jurisprudence." Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan
Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J 2505, 2513 (1997). For a recent in-depth examination of the equal
rights versus special rights debate, see Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the
Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 564 (1998).
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members of a minority group based on race or national origin.' 44 Against
this backdrop, the remainder of this Note will observe how the cultural
defense may be defended against "special rights" objections by appeal to
the same logic that insulates antidiscrimination statutes from similar
critiques.
As the First Circuit recently observed, while equal protection doctrine
subjects governmental actions that benefit a racial group (and other suspect
categories) to the highest level of scrutiny, not every law that takes account
of these categories is constitutionally suspect. 45 Most antidiscrimination
statutes by definition are concerned with group-based differences, yet there
is no presumption that these laws may be unlawful.1 46 As Peter Rubin
observes, since the Constitution itself contains an antidiscrimination
command,147 statutes that merely mirror this mandate and reflect a concern
with group-based differences cannot be suspect 4' Although the charge that
laws designed to protect members of various groups actually grant these
groups special treatment has become increasingly common,149 the Supreme
Court explicitly repudiated the "special rights" critique in Romer v.
Evans."'0 Striking down Colorado's infamous initiative banning laws
protecting homosexuals from discrimination, the Court held: "[Tihe
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection from injuries caused by discrimination .... [W]e cannot accept
the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does
no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights." "'
Perhaps more significant for the purposes of this analysis is a federal
antidiscrimination law that directs state and local governments to provide
"reasonable accommodations" (such as wheelchair accessible entrances to
public buildings) to the disabled. While one might charge that the American
with Disabilities Act (ADA)52 compels that disabled persons be provided
special rights, it is in fact "uniformly (albeit not universally) accepted as a
'traditional' antidiscrimination law, a law designed to provide equal
144. Peter Rubin observes that the antidiscrimination cause has been dealt a serious blow by
the tendency of both common citizens and jurists to "conflate antidiscrimination laws... with
affirmative action provisions whose constitutionality can be determined... only after they have
been subjected to searching judicial scrutiny." Rubin, supra note 143, at 565.
145. See Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (Ist Cir. 1998) (holding that the belief that a racial
motive embodied in a government action is synonymous with a constitutional violation is
mistaken).
146. See id. ("Every antidiscrimination statute aimed at racial discrimination, and every
enforcement measure taken under such a statute, reflect a concern with race. That does not make
such enactments or actions.., automatically 'suspect' under the Equal Protection Clause.").
147. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
148. See Rubin, supra note 143, at 597; see also Raso, 135 F.3d at 16.
149. See Rubin, supra note 143, at 570.
150. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
151. Id. at 631.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
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treatment."'' 3 Thus, the ADA's reasonable accommodation component
suggests that circumstances exist in which a failure to recognize and act on
the basis of crucial differences among groups will result in unlawful
discrimination. 1"4
Although the ADA may be distinguished from other antidiscrimination
laws in that it manifests not only a concern with group classifications but
also compels action based on such classifications, this difference is only a
matter of degree. A few commentators have argued that ADA measures
resemble affirmative action programs more than antidiscrimination laws
precisely because they grant "special treatment,"' 55 but this analogy is
ultimately untenable. Reasonable accommodation measures grant "special
treatment" only to the extent necessary to achieve formal equality of
access.'56 The real difference between the ADA and a traditional
antidiscrimination statute therefore lies only in the form of discrimination
each law seeks to address. The traditional statute defines discrimination as
an action taken on the basis of group differences, but the ADA recognizes
that discrimination may also take the form of an omission to act on the basis
of such differences.' 57 On this account, the special treatment supposedly
given to the disabled by the ADA is no more special than the protection
afforded other groups by other antidiscrimination statutes. Such
comparisons demonstrate that when the benefit that a "preferred" group
receives is merely the restoration of a right or protection enjoyed by
everyone else, the action coheres with the Equal Protection Clause.
Returning to the cultural defense, it is clear that recognition of group-
based cultural differences is necessary to restore to cultural defendants a
specific doctrinal protection-the provocation defense. Like traditional
antidiscrimination statutes and the ADA, recognition of cultural evidence
does not grant preferential treatment, but instead is an instrument that
advances formal equality of access. Reasonable persons may disagree over
153. Rubin, supra note 143, at 595 (emphasis added).
154. Here the comments of Professor Edward Steinman, although made in another context,
are especially apt:
A focus on segregation and the treatment of blacks, in essence, provides one notion of
inequality: taking people who are the same and treating them differently. That is only half
of the coin. The other side of inequality is more subtle, less visible, and equally invidious.
It is taking [individuals] who are different and treating them the same.
ANCHETA, supra note 1, at 105 (quoting Edward Steinman).
155. See, e.g., Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Search for the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REv. 575, 585 (1998).
156. See, e.g., Note, Toward Reasonable Equality: Accommodating Learning Disabilities
Under the American with Disabilities Act, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1560, 1574 (1998) (commenting
that affirmative action is a "band-aid measure," while the ADA "require[s] institutions to
reconsider and explain what constitutes their 'essential' function with respect to all individuals").
157. To be precise, the ADA defines discrimination to include "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability .... 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A).
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whether admission of cultural evidence at criminal trials constitutes mere
recognition of group-based difference or "action" taken on the basis of
such difference. But the distinction is ultimately unimportant, for even if
the latter view is taken, such culture-conscious action is necessary in the
criminal law to avoid a serious constitutional harm and achieve legal parity.
Indeed, while the analogy between an antidiscrimination law and the
cultural defense is useful for demonstrating the infirmities of the "special
rights" critique, the harms each addresses are not commensurate. The due
process concerns implicated in the criminal context make the threat to
equality of access faced by cultural defendants necessarily of constitutional
significance-which distinguishes such harms from the private misconduct
covered by antidiscrimination statutes not actionable under the Fourteenth
Amendment. It thus bears emphasis that cultural defendants (unlike most
Title VII or ADA plaintiffs) potentially face the deprivation of their most
fundamental right. Insofar as the failure to recognize the influence of the
defendant's cultural background denies him a criminal defense available to
all others, the defendant's right to a fair trial is at stake-which is, of
course, potentially a matter of life or death.
Cultural defendants are different in respects that are highly relevant to
the treatment they should receive at the hands of the criminal justice
system. Courts must take account of these crucial differences between
foreign defendants and the dominant group in order to provide the former
with the same basic protection "in respect to life and liberty" 158 available to
all other persons. Insofar as a limited cultural defense merely restores to
cultural defendants the same constitutional protections enjoyed by all others
in the criminal process, it secures for these defendants due process of law
and is consistent with the antidiscrimination principle.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that (1) the logic that underpins the introduction
of cultural evidence is fundamentally incompatible with the temporary-
insanity defense; and (2) that cultural evidence is properly understood under
the doctrinal rubric of the provocation defense. Crucial to these arguments
was an examination of the interplay between the concepts of sameness and
difference, as well as the impact these concepts have on the processes by
which courts extend sympathy to criminal defendants. The concept of true
(inter)cultural difference frightens courts because it threatens to defuse the
mechanisms that produce sympathy for the defendant. If a judge cannot
identify with the defendant, he will be unable to grant her leniency. Hence,
158. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 129, at 309 (quoting Representative John Bingham's
statement on the principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause).
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in People v. Chen, the court ostensibly focused on the defendant's cultural
difference as an indicator of mental state, but embraced it (and sympathized
with the defendant) only to the extent that this "difference" resonated with
familiar, dominant cultural sensibilities.
The efficacy of the cultural defense under the current jurisprudence
depends perversely on the extent to which culture can be concealed or
erased. One effective way to erase culture from the analysis is through the
imposition of a "mental defect" model upon the cultural defendant. As in
People v. Kimura, courts have subjected the defendant's claim to the "dual
personhood"/temporary-insanity paradigm in order to cast the defendant as
a victim, thus enabling the court to identify and sympathize with her. Yet
this jurisprudence ultimately fails to reconcile culture as defect with the
notion of defect as difference, producing the paradoxical and logically
untenable implication that the defendant is "strange" or different even
within the context of her own culture.
This Note has proposed that courts make an honest effort to reckon
with intercultural difference and intracultural sameness. The meaning and
relevance of the role of culture in any criminal defense ultimately hinge on
these two concepts. Intracultural sameness suggests that the defendant's
action is reasonable within the defendant's own cultural system.
Intercultural difference makes relevant the presentation of cultural evidence
in the first place-absent such difference, a court could simply use
dominant cultural norms to analyze the defendant's claim. The inverse of
these concepts-intracultural difference and intercultural sameness-would
invalidate or render meaningless any cultural defense claim. Yet, as the
cases examined herein have demonstrated, courts routinely make such
"inversing" moves when trying cultural defense cases.
My proposal for a synthetic model of provocation and culture
necessitates taking the role of culture seriously, forcing courts to
acknowledge that the defendant manifests a rational, unitary identity and is
not the unfortunate victim of an insane alter ego. This model would prevent
courts from manipulating the doctrinal framework in order to identify with
the defendant, but it challenges courts to adhere to equitable principles in
order to grant leniency to the defendant in any case. Indeed, recognition of
the role culture plays in provocation would compel courts to acknowledge
difference, as well as the validity of this difference as an alternative source
of norms.
1884 [Vol. 108:1845
